Advisory Opinion No. 2015-16

Approved: April 14, 2015

Re:  Christine J. Engustian, Esq. 

QUESTION PRESENTED:

The Petitioner, the former Probate Judge for the City of East Providence, a municipal appointed position, requests an advisory opinion regarding whether the Code of Ethics prohibits her from representing clients before the East Providence Probate Court and the East Providence City Council within one year following the date of her official severance from the East Providence Probate Court. 

RESPONSE:

It is the opinion of the Rhode Island Ethics Commission that the Petitioner, the former Probate Judge for the City of East Providence, a municipal appointed position, is not prohibited by the Code of Ethics from representing clients before the East Providence Probate Court and the East Providence City Council within one year following the date of her official severance from the East Providence Probate Court. 

The Petitioner represents that she served as Judge for the East Providence Probate Court (“Probate Court”) in the City of East Providence (“City”) from December 2008 through November 30, 2014.  She states that she was appointed to this position by the East Providence City Council (“City Council”).  She informs that, in her private capacity, she is an attorney.  She seeks guidance as to whether the Code of Ethics’ revolving door prohibitions prevent her from representing clients before the City Council and the Probate Court prior to November 30, 2015. 

Section 5(e) of the Code of Ethics strictly prohibits public officials and employees from representing themselves, or another person as their attorney, before a state or municipal agency of which they are a member or by which they are employed.  R.I. Gen. Laws § 36-14-5(e)(1) & (2);  Commission Regulation 36-14-5016(b)(1).[1]  These prohibitions continue while the official remains in office and for a period of one year thereafter.  Section 36-14-5(e)(4).  However, section 5(e)(4) states that “this prohibition shall not pertain to a matter of public record in a court of law.” 

In prior advisory opinions, the Commission has recognized that the one-year probationary restriction set forth in section 5(e)(4) does not extend to individuals who wish to represent clients before probate courts, within one-year from the date of their official severance from public service, because such representation pertains to matters of public record in a court of law.  See A.O. 2009-36 (opining that the former Coventry Probate Court Judge could represent clients before the Coventry Probate Court prior to one-year from his termination from service as Probate Court Judge because the Coventry Probate Court is a court of public record); A.O. 2002-9 (opining that the former Woonsocket Probate Court Judge could represent clients before the Woonsocket Probate Court immediately upon leaving his position because the Probate Court is a court of public record).  See also A.O. 2015-1 (opining, inter alia, that a former member of the East Providence City Council, who was also an attorney, could represent clients before the East Providence Probate Court within one year from the date of his official severance from the City Council, because such representation pertained to matters of public record in a court of law and, therefore, was not subject to the one-year probationary restriction).

In the present matter, consistent with our prior advisory opinions, we find that the Petitioner’s representation of clients before the Probate Court falls squarely within the exception to the one-year probationary restriction for matters of public record in a court of law.  Section 36-14-5(e)(4). 

The Commission has also opined that various types of municipal judges, including probate court judges, are not prohibited by the Code of Ethics from representing clients before other municipal entities over which they did not have jurisdiction in their role as a judge.  See A.O. 2007-12 (opining that a judicial candidate for the Providence Housing Court could continue his private practice of law before various agencies within the City of Providence if appointed to the Providence Housing Court); A.O. 2003-71 (opining that the Tiverton Municipal Court Judge, who was appointed by the Tiverton Town Council, was not prohibited by the Code of Ethics from representing private clients before the Tiverton Town Council, provided that the representation was not related to a matter in which he was involved as Municipal Court Judge or over which the Municipal Court had jurisdiction).

Here, although the Petitioner was appointed to her former position as Probate Court Judge by the City Council, she was neither a member nor an employee of the City Council.  The Petitioner’s duties as Probate Judge were limited to adjudicating certain matters, outside of the City Council’s jurisdiction, such as decedents’ estates, adult limited guardianships, minor guardianships, adult adoptions and name changes.  Furthermore, the Rhode Island Superior Court, not the City Council, has jurisdiction over Probate Court appeals.  See A.O. 1999-19 (opining that the Cranston Probate Court Judge, who was appointed by the Cranston City Council, could represent clients before the Cranston City Council, Planning Commission and Zoning Board of Review, provided that his representation did not relate to matters with which he was involved as Probate Judge or over which the Probate Court had jurisdiction).  Therefore, section 5(e)’s one-year probationary restriction is also inapplicable to the Petitioner’s representation of clients before the City Council. 

For all of these reasons, it is the opinion of the Ethics Commission that the Petitioner is not prohibited by the Code of Ethics from representing clients before the East Providence Probate Court and the East Providence City Council within one year following the date of her official severance from the East Providence Probate Court. 

This Advisory Opinion is strictly limited to the facts stated herein and relates only to the application of the Rhode Island Code of Ethics.  Under the Code of Ethics, advisory opinions are based on the representations made by, or on behalf of, a public official or employee and are not adversarial or investigative proceedings.  Finally, this Commission offers no opinion on the effect that any other statute, regulation, ordinance, constitutional provision, charter provision, or canon of professional ethics may have on this situation. 

Code Citations:

§ 36-14-5(e)

Commission Regulation 36-14-5016

Related Advisory Opinions:

A.O. 2015-1

A.O. 2009-36

A.O. 2007-12

A.O. 2003-71

A.O. 2002-9

A.O. 1999-19

Keywords: 

Revolving Door


[1] Commission Regulation 36-14-5016(b)(1) provides that a person “represent[s] any other person before a state or municipal agency” if: 

He or she is authorized by that other person to act, and does in fact act, as the other person’s attorney at law or his or her attorney in fact in the presentation of evidence or arguments before that agency for the purpose of influencing the judgment of the agency in favor of that person.